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ABSTRACT
The factories of the future require efficient interconnection of their
physical machines into the cyber space to cope with the emerging
need of an increased uptime of machines, higher performance rates,
an improved level of productivity and a collective collaboration
along the supply chain. With the rapid growth of the Internet of
Things (IoT), and its application in industrial areas, the so called
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)/Industry 4.0 emerged. However,
further to the rapid growth of IoT/IIoT systems, cyber attacks are
an emerging threat and simple manual security testing can often
not cope with the scale of large IoT/IIoT networks.
In this paper, we suggest to extract metadata from commonly
used diagrams and models in a typical software development pro-
cess, to automate the process of threat modelling, security analysis
and penetration testing, without detailed prior security knowledge.
In that context, we present requirements and recommendations for
metadata in IoT/IIoT models that are needed as necessary input
parameters of security assurance tools.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the Internet of Things (IoT) reaching manufacturing systems,
the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) or Industry 4.0 was forged
(see Figure 1) [10, 36]. This technology enhances traditional control
systems to form Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), a new class of sys-
tems that embeds cyber capabilities into the physical world. While
this enables advanced reconfiguration and scalability, it however
also introduces complexity and potential instability [42]. Enhance-
ments for production include [57]:
IoT
IIoT
Industry 4.0
Figure 1: The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is a subset
of the Internet of Things (IoT).
• Horizontal integration through value networks;
• Vertical integration and networked manufacturing systems;
• End-to-end digital integration of engineering across the en-
tire value chain.
These traits make the IIoT more useful and leverage proliferation –
the expected growth of IoT in general is exponential (see Figure 2).
This, however, also raises the attractiveness for adversaries to per-
form malicious actions to gain fame or profit [24]. Furthermore,
connecting production networks both to each other and the Internet
has consequences that are hard to estimate from a security perspec-
tive. This is because they can cause side effects. For instance, they
could open an attack surface by introducing unintended connec-
tions and/or expose devices that are not meant to be connected and
therefore lack of security features such as proper authentication to
threats from external sources [49]. Also, many IoT protocols, both
wired [59] and wireless [38], have known flaws that could allow
for adversaries to launch successful attacks against a network. To
counter this potential attacks, a structured approach to facilitate
security assurance is needed, which involves design, analysis and
testing. This paper therefore outlines building blocks for a system-
atic methodology of providing security assurance, specialized for
the IIoT.
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Figure 2: Estimated growth of connected devices in the IoT1.
1.1 Research Gap and Related Work
With the rapid growth of the IoT (see Figure 2) also concerns have
been raised that without appropriate considerationsmany new secu-
rity challenges arise. In particular, as the IoT is interconnected and
spreads widely, cyber attacks are an emerging threat [9, 31, 39, 47].
Therefore, researchers from academia and industry are analysing
the security aspects of IoT systems [48]. Current research directions
are mainly focusing on anomaly detection for security components
in IoT systems [16, 46, 60] and penetration testing for IoT sys-
tems [12]. However, with the rapid growth of the IoT/IIoT systems,
security analysis and manual security testing of an IoT system can
often not cope with large scale IoT networks. Recent directions in
security analysis of IoT systems have focused on automated secu-
rity analysis. In most of the works so far, initially a detailed threat
model of the IoT system under test has to be generated [58], then
automated security tests [37] and penetration tests [3] are executed.
While this approach enables to automate penetration testing, still
a detailed threat model has to be available. A natural further step
would be to extract the necessary information needed to automate
penetration tests already from more commonly used diagrams and
models in the software development process (i.e. Unified Modelling
Language, ...).
1.2 Contributions and Outline
In this work, we define requirements and recommendations of
IoT/IIoT system models to include certain metadata that includes
necessary input parameters of security assurance tools. This ap-
proach can further help to automate the process of penetration
testing, threat modelling and security analysis, without any de-
tailed security knowledge.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we analyse the typical components of IoT and IIoT models
and specify architectural patterns used in cyber-physical systems.
Section 3 gives an overview of a typical security assurance pro-
cess. Moreover, we review state-of-the-art penetration testing tools,
threat modelling-tools, and give details on the security analysis
process. Furthermore, we extract the required input parameter of
1Data obtained from: https://www.comptia.org/resources/
internet-of-things-insights-and-opportunities, Date accessed: 14.05.2019
most commonly used security assurance tools. In Section 4 we
provide requirements and recommendations for the metadata used
in IoT/IIoT models that need to be extracted to automate those
security assurance tools. Finally, Section 5 concludes this work and
states some future research questions.
2 ARCHITECTURAL PATTERNS AND
CONCEPTS FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS
Future factories require efficient interconnection of their physical
machines to improve the level of productivity, performance, re-
source consumption, and uptime of machines with the purpose of
generally increasing the collective collaboration along the supply
chain. Higher production quality, reduced downtime and real-time
competitive edge is what manufacturers want to achieve in an IIoT
setting, compared to the currently existing setting of disconnected
machines [11]. The basic technology platform that connects IoT
and IIoT systems is also often referred to as Cyber-Physical System
(CPS) [32, 33, 44].
Usually security testing is limited by resources (i.e. time, com-
plexity of the system under test, etc.). To overcome these limitations,
an actual IoT/IIoT system can be abstracted as a model. The model
is an abstraction of the real-world IoT/IIoT system under test, that
should optimally re-enact the expected behaviour of the system. In
the following, we give a classification of the most commonly used
devices and components in IoT/IIoT systems.
2.1 Smart Devices and Sensors
In IoT systems, these are all end-user devices and sensors that are
used to collect information. In IIoT systems, these are a constituent
part of cyber-physical systems (CPS), which integrate physical
systems to software and communication systems. These devices
include, for example, temperature sensors, thermostats, pressure
sensors, humidity and moisture level sensors, light intensity detec-
tors, proximity detection, RFID, and others.
2.2 Networks and Protocols
The IoT requires huge scalability in the network space to handle
the vast number of interconnected devices. With billions of devices
being added, networks and protocols have to be adapted to handle
the data flow. While traditional networks like IPv4 Ethernet and
WIFI are not optimised for IoT use cases [51] (e.g. the address space
of IPv4 allows 232 = 4.3 billion devices, while estimates show that
there will be around 50 billion IoT devices in 2020 [53]), different
networks and protocols emerged like Bluetooth LE [43], ZigBee [2],
MQTT [7], Z-Wave [29], LoRAWAN [13], IPv6 [15], and others.
2.3 Gateways
In IoT networks, many different networks and protocols have to
interact in association with each other. IoT gateways can be config-
ured to manage bidirectional data traffic to ensure interconnectivity
of devices and sensors as well as to ensure compatibility of network
protocols.
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2.4 Cloud/Servers
The IoT generates massive amounts of data from devices, sensors,
applications and users that have to be managed efficiently. IIoT
networks may require real-time analysis of sensor data and accu-
rate analytics that cannot be provided by sensors due to limited
resources and are, therefore, performed at different levels (edge,
fog, cloud). Clouds are often further used to provide data storage,
analytics, infrastructure and services to billions of interconnected
devices.
2.5 Analysis/Actuators
Based on sensor data, several actuators in IoT networks can perform
services and further cloud-based services can produce real-time
insights. Big enterprises collect vast amounts of data that needs to be
carefully analysed according to individual business use cases. In IIoT
networks often several sensors simultaneously provide information
that needs to be combined and analysed.
2.6 User Interface.
User interfaces are the accessible parts of the IoT that connect the
user with devices. In IIoT networks the user interfaces are often
replaced by well-defined APIs that offer an interface for other smart
services and back-end systems, often referred to as machine-to-
machine (M2M) communications.
2.7 Smart Services and Back-end Systems
While IoT systems tend to outsource their whole infrastructure,
computation and storage to cloud services, IIoT systems mainly
process information in back-end systems within the internal net-
work of a company. Therefore, the interplay between cloud-based
services and smart services in the back-end of a company has to be
enabled.
2.8 Big Data Analytics/Artificial
Intelligence/Machine Learning
The sensors and devices connected to IoT and IIoT networks pro-
duce vast amounts of data that need to be efficiently processed and
analysed. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a field of computer science
that describes machines that mimic cognitive functions of humans
such as learning and problem solving. Machine learning (ML) is
a core part of AI that allows software to predict outcomes and to
find patterns without being explicitly programmed. Both AI and
ML techniques are used in IoT/IIoT networks to efficiently analyse
data [19, 30].
3 SECURITY ASSURANCE BY VIRTUE OF
THREAT MODELLING, SECURITY
ANALYSIS AND PENETRATION TESTING
When evaluating the security of IoT systems with certain security
assurance methodologies and penetration testing tools, we have to
define an attacker model, the procedure of penetration tests, as well
as the information needed for the input parameters of the security
assurance tools. A structured approach to define such a security
development process is to follow a five steps development process
and define security actions within each. Table 1 shows the mapping
Table 1: Development Phases and Security Actions [35].
Development Phase Security Action
Requirement Inception
Design Design & Threat Modelling
Implementation Guidelines & Best Practices
Verification Security Push (including penetra-
tion testing)
Release Final Security Review
of security actions to the development process as outlined by the
Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [35].
The inception phase consists of project planning, while the final
security review involves reviews (threat models), finishing (pene-
tration testing) and documentation archiving. While this approach
is intended for use with software, the process is similar for other
purposes (for instance a cyber security implementation process for
nuclear facility safety systems [41]). In order to provide means for
security assurance of (I)IoT models, we concentrate on the design,
implementation and verification phases of the SDL approach and
specify the three main action groups in more detail:
• Threat modelling;
• Security analysis (to generate guidelines);
• Penetration testing (also called attack testing).
This can also be matched with the perspective of another model
that describes the security needs as overlap of threats, design and
goals [56]. The design part in that model is seen a little differently
than in the SDL, as it is defined as features that define security
and efforts to shape these features, where the latter resemble the
guidelines generation in the SDL. Therefore, the security analysis
in this paper can be seen as means to address the design, the threat
modelling copes with the threat part of that model, and penetration
testing is used to verify the fulfilment of security goals.
Attacker Model. We also have to consider different attacker mod-
els, to represent the capabilities of an attacker. For simplification,
we consider the Dolev-Yao attacker model [18], which means that
an attacker can overhear, intercept and synthesize any message
in the network, and is only limited by the cryptographic methods
that are used. Moreover, an attacker can encrypt and decrypt with
any keys she knows/successfully obtains. For simplicity, we do not
distinguish between remote attackers and attackers with physical
access to devices in this work.
3.1 Threat Modelling
Threat modelling is an approach with the goal to identify threats
and vulnerabilities within IT system architectures [52]. Figure 3
gives an overview of the possible threat scenarios for different
components of IoT/IIoT systems.
In Section 4 we define IoT specific properties to extend the stan-
dard threat model approach. Threats are divided into six categories,
which are defined in the STRIDE model [21]:
• Spoofing identity. A user or service illegally accesses and
uses other authentication information to gain illegitimate
access to a system or data.
ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom Ankele, et al.
physical systems
cyber systems
Sensor
Communication
ActuatorStorage
Computing
• Sensor spoofing
• Denial of Service (DoS)
• Eavesdropping
• Packet modification
• Man-in-the-middle
• Resource blocking
• Authentication failure
• Deadline miss
• Relay attacks
• Storage modification
• Data remanence
• Information leakage
• Computing error
• Timing error
Figure 3: Example attacks on IIoT systems.
• Tampering with data. Data tampering occurs when data
is malicious modified. This includes data at rest, data in use
as well as data in transit.
• Repudiation This means that an entity may plausibly deny
an action that it has taken. Countering these threats usually
requires a combination of authentication, authorization and
logging, ideally in a cryptographically secured way.
• Information disclosure.Refers to any information exposed
to unauthorised users.
• Denial of service (DoS). DoS attacks deny services avail-
ability to valid users.
• Elevation of privilege. These threats occur when unpriv-
ileged users gain privileged access and, thus, are able to
compromise an entire system.
3.2 Security Analysis
In security analysis and cryptanalysis, an information system is
studied in order to find hidden or unknown aspects of the system
to identify possible weaknesses. Often this mathematical analy-
sis targets detailed aspects of the underlying encryption schemes,
protocols, and hardware used in IT system architectures.
The importance of a detailed security analysis of the primitives
of encryption schemes and security protocols are highlighted in
the case of many recent attacks on IoT systems [47]. Recently, also
many international standards and even well studied primitives have
been broken. This include cryptographic modes of operation (i.e.
OCB2 [22] which was standardised as ISO19772 [23]), the standard
hash algorithm SHA-1 [34, 54], and also many block ciphers [4, 20].
While many of this detailed analysis of encryption schemes and
protocols are done manually, in recent years the trend to automate
parts in this security analysis emerged. Nowadays, many optimisa-
tion tools are used to automatically analyse encryption schemes (i.e.
using mixed integer linear programming [40], boolean satisfiability
solver and satisfiability modular theories solver [5], as well as tools
based on constraint programming [55]) or security protocols (e.g. in
the symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3 [14]). In an approach to automate
the analysis of cryptographic primitives and security protocols,
detailed information about the protocol version (e.g. TLS 1.3), the
cipher suite (e.g. AES-GCM), block length and key lengths (e.g.
128-bit) are required.
3.3 Penetration Testing
Penetration testing is the process of testing computer systems as
well as human resources (social engineering) to identify security
threats and possible vulnerabilities. These tests can be performed
from the inside and from the outside of the systems under test to en-
sure that all possible options of an attacker are covered. The aim of
each penetration test is to specify guidelines and recommendations
which address the identified issues.
3.3.1 Attack Procedure. It is essential to define the preconditions
of the testing environment as well as the used attack procedure. The
preconditions include organisational measures that usually consist
of a contract that defines the scope of penetration test, the schedule,
people and their availability as well as the reporting procedure. For
the attack procedures, we can define three approaches based on the
information that an attacker has.
• Black-box testing: Only basic information about the target
system/network is available, or no information is available.
• Grey-box testing: Limited information is available to the
attacker (i.e. this can be knowledge about the target network,
number of hosts, network infrastructure, ...).
• White-box testing: Detailed background information is
available to the attacker. Moreover, system information is
available (i.e. the attacker has access to the source code, has
a detailed overview of the network architecture, ...)
While the black box approach is the most realistic, as an attacker
typically accesses the target system from an outside network (e.g.
the Internet), an attacker however can also gain access within a
network (i.e. by getting physical access). In that case, an attacker
can scan the network and obtain valuable information that can later
be used in an attack.
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3.3.2 Penetration Testing Phases. The process of penetration tests
can be simplified into the following phases [1, 6]:
• Reconnaissance: In this initial phase, information about
the target system, software and users is gathered. This infor-
mation can later be used to attack the target system.
• Scanning: In this phase, technical tools are used to further
the attacker’s knowledge about the target system.
• Gaining Access: In this phase, the attacker actively tries to
exploit the systems by using the information gathered in the
previous phases.
• MaintainingAccess:An attacker is required to persistently
be able to access the target system to gather as much data
as possible.
• Covering Tracks: An attacker must erase any traces, such
as log files, in order to remain anonymous.
3.3.3 Penetration Testing Tools. This section gives a short overview
about the most common penetration testing tools (Note, all of them
are available in Kali Linux [45]) and their usage in certain testing
phases.
• Nmap is a free open source network scanner which is used
within the reconnaissance and scanning phases. It scans sin-
gle IPs as well as IP ranges and provides useful information
like the used operating system, identified services and open
ports.
• Metasploit is an open source framework which is used for
information gathering as well as for executing exploits. The
tool comes with a set of pre-installed exploit and auxiliary
scripts.
• Sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool which is
used to automate the process of exploiting SQL databases. It
also can be used for detecting the used database and version.
Therefore, the tool can be used within the reconnaissance
as well as within the gaining access phase.
• Subfinder is an open source subdomain discovery tool.
• DMitry is an information gathering tool which can be used
to obtain whois information, uptime information, email ad-
dresses and subdomains. Furthermore, the tool can also be
used to perform port scans.
• Burp Suite is a powerful platform for security testing of web
applications. It can be used to scan automatically for common
web vulnerabilities but also offers advanced manual testing
techniques to enhance each penetration testing phase.
3.3.4 Required Input Parameters for Penetration Testing Tools. We
analysed several penetration testing tools (most of them are freely
available in Kali Linux [45]) regarding the input requirements they
need, to optimally obtain as much information as possible from a
target, as well as the information needed to find targeted vulner-
abilities and exploits. We arrange the input requirements for the
penetration testing tool according to the penetration testing phases
as defined above. Table 2 gives an overview of the necessary input
information for penetration testing tools. We just list the first three
penetration testing phases, as they can easily be automated once
there are publicly known exploits available. Using more detailed
exploits and maintaining access to a target, often requires user
interaction.
Table 2: Penetration testing tool requirements.
Pentest Phase Input Requirements
Reconnaissance IP address, host names, network ad-
dresses, hardware interfaces, ...
Scanning Web URL’s IP addresses, network inter-
faces, port numbers, operating system
information, ...
Gaining Access Operating system information, software
versions, protocol versions, ...
3.3.5 On Automating Security Assurance Tools. Automating secu-
rity assurance tools is often cumbersome, as most of the tools do
not provide software API’s or standardised output formats. There-
fore, often security auditors and penetration testers are needed to
manually interpret the results and act based on the outputs of the
tools. Yet, some of the penetration testing tools, like nmap2 and
metasploit3, provide an API, store output in XML format, or provide
simple scripting languages to automate scanning and testing.
4 REQUIREMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IOT/IIOT
MODELS
Security testing is the process to validate and verify that a system
under test meets its security requirements. As already outlined in
Section 2, a model-based approach can be used to abstract a real-
world IoT/IIoT system. Model-based security testing is discussed in
more detail in [50].
In large industrial IoT systems, the complexity of the system is
often too high for manual testing. Moreover, to improve effective-
ness, efficiency, quality and to be able to repeat a testing process
as often as required, automated testing systems are needed. How-
ever, to automate security testing of IoT/IIoT systems, the IoT/IIoT
models that abstract the real-world systems under test have to be
as accurate as possible.
We give a non-exhaustive list of security requirements that mod-
els of IoT/IIoT components should include, to optimise the auto-
mated information gathering phase of the security assurance tools
(as discussed in Section 3). In general, the more information can be
abstracted from the real-world into a model, the more information
can then be used in the attacks.
4.1 Limitations and Restrictions
Depending on the size of a IoT system a detailed security analysis
and detailed penetration tests can quickly exhaust the available re-
sources. Therefore, we have to limit the level of detail of the security
analysis and take some assumptions into consideration. In general,
we assume that the cryptographic primitives are based on well-
studied standards and therefore we do not consider detailed attacks
on the building blocks (i.e. such as block ciphers, cryptographic
modes). Yet, this does not include misconfiguration of cipher suites,
as these belong to the most common errors. Moreover, not all steps
2https://nmap.org/book/nse-api.html
3https://metasploit.help.rapid7.com/docs/rest-api
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Table 3: Desired parameters of IoT/IIoT components. SD&S: Smart Devices and Sensors, N&P: Networks and Protocols, G: Gate-
ways,C&S:Cloud and Servers, SS&BS: Smart Services andBackend Systems,UI:User Interfaces. The priority for each parameter
is indicated with colour (red = high, yellow = medium, green = low).
Parameter Description IoT/IIoT Components
SD&S N&P G C&S SS&BS UI
Network Properties
Hardware interface Indicates all available interfaces (i.e. network, USB). ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Connection type Indicates if the network is a physical network (Ethernet)or if the network is wireless (WIFI, Bluetooth, NFC, ...). ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IP address Indicates the IPv4/IPv6 addresses. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
MAC address Indicates the MAC addresses. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Network protocols Lists all supported network protocols. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Protocol version Describes the protocol version used (i.e. TLS 1.3). ✓ ✓ ✓
Pairing process Indicates how the device connects to other devices. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Hardware Properties
Secure key store
Indicates if a secure key store is available (i.e. Secure
Element, Hardware Security Module, or Trusted Platform
Module).
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Data storage Indicates if data is stored internally. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Power consumption Indicates the power consumption. ✓
Electromagnetic
emission Indicates the electromagnetic emission. ✓
Software & Operating System Properties
Operating system Indicates the operating system version (i.e. Windows 10). ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Firmware version Indicates the firmware version. ✓ ✓
Software APIs Lists the available APIs. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Software versions Lists the other software versions running on the device. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Interfaces Lists the available interfaces that can be used to connectto a IoT system (i.e. graphical UIs, command line UIs). ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Administration Indicates how the system is maintained (remote access). ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Update process Indicates how software/firmware updates are received(i.e. over the air). ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Reset functionality Indicates how the device can be reset to an initial setting. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Shared resources Indicates if resources are shared with otherusers/processes. ✓ ✓ ✓
Security Properties
Encryption Indicates if the channel is end-to-end encrypted. ✓
Data integrity Indicates if the data integrity of the connection is ensured. ✓
Authentication Indicates if authentication is required. ✓ ✓
Input sanitization Indicates if the user inputs are checked before forwardedto backend systems. ✓ ✓
Performance Properties
Bandwidth Indicates the maximum rate of network packets that aresent in a time interval (measured in bits/second). ✓ ✓ ✓
Throughput Indicates the actual rate of network packets that are sentin a time interval (measured in bits/second). ✓ ✓ ✓
Latency Indicates the delay between a data packet sent from thesource until it is received at the destination. ✓ ✓ ✓
Error rate Indicates the number of corrupted bits as a percentage ofthe total sent bits. ✓ ✓ ✓
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in security tests can be automated. Therefore, some steps of secu-
rity tests have to be managed by experienced security auditors and
cryptographers.
4.2 Required Properties of IoT/IIoT Models for
Safe and Secure IoT/IIoT Systems
In the following, we list desired parameters that should be consid-
ered in IoT/IIoT models. If some parameters are unknown in the
initial modelling phase, they can be added/updated later during an
information gathering phase, which is part of penetration testing,
or be specified when a more detailed threat model is generated. Ta-
ble 3 lists the desired properties for the below mentioned IoT/IIoT
components.
4.2.1 Smart Devices and Sensors. Smart devices and sensors that
are connected to networks are potential threats, as they can have
security vulnerabilities due to outdated operating systems, inse-
cure software versions, open network ports, unsecured hardware
interfaces, and many more security issues [26].
4.2.2 Networks and Protocols. IoT networks are used to intercon-
nect several IoT devices and sensors with back-end or cloud systems
via the Internet. Often different types of networks are used, also
with many different protocols. Potential threats in IoT networks
can occur, if outdated protocols are used that have security vulner-
abilities [8, 25, 27], or if different networks have different security
requirements.
4.2.3 Gateways. IoT gateways are physical devices or software pro-
grams that serve as a connection point between smart devices/sensors
and servers in a cloud. Those gateways are used to perform protocol
translation, data processing, data storage and filtering. Potential
threats can occur in the protocol translation when different secu-
rity requirements are set or unsecured network interfaces, open
hardware ports or vulnerable software is used.
4.2.4 Cloud/Servers. Cloud-based services are often used in IoT
systems for infrastructure, data storage, data processing and analyt-
ics. Usually these services are provided by third parties. Therefore,
potential threats can occur if data is not encrypted, or an adversary
has access to any servers in the particular cloud.
4.2.5 Smart Service and Back-end Systems. Often IIoT devices and
sensors in smart factories produce huge amounts of data that are
first filtered and pre-processed in a cloud system, and then fur-
ther processed and stored in back-end systems within a company
network. Potential threats for those smart services and back-end
systems can occur from denial of service (DoS) attacks, as well
as through open network ports, outdated software, misconfigured
hardware/software and other security issues.
4.2.6 User Interfaces. User interfaces are the accessible parts of
IoT systems, that are normally controlled by human users. Potential
threats can occur as interfaces as well as users themselves are a
relatively easy link to exploit. This can occur from misconfigura-
tion in user interfaces, weak passwords, social engineering [28],
phishing [17] and software vulnerabilities.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyse the current state of security assurance
methodologies such as threat modelling, security analysis and pen-
etration testing in the context of IoT/IIoT systems. After identifying
shortcomings in the manual testing strategies that are sufficient in
small scale computer networks, we pinpoint the need for automated
security analysis in large scale IoT/IIoT networks.
In that context, we first classify the typical components of IoT/IIoT
systems. By analysing the most commonly used security testing
tools, we identify a list of required input parameters and metadata
that needs to be available at the time of a detailed security analysis.
Therefore, we define detailed requirement and recommendations
for metadata that needs to be present in IoT/IIoT system models,
which are found along the software development process. Using
this metadata information, the security assurance process can effi-
ciently be automated, making detailed security testing possible in
even large scale IoT/IIoT networks.
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